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Abstract
As the current COVID-19 outbreak shows, disease epidemic is a complex problem which
must be tackled with the right public policy. One of the main tools of the policymakers is to
control the contact rate among the population, commonly referred to as social distancing, in
order to reduce the spread of the disease. We pose a mean-field game model of individuals each
choosing a dynamic strategy of making contacts, given the trade-off of utility from contacts but
also risk of infection from those contacts. We compute and compare the mean-field equilibrium
(MFE) strategy, which assumes individuals acting selfishly to maximize their own utility,
to the socially optimal strategy, which is the strategy maximizing the total utility of the
population. We prove that the infected always want to make more contacts than the level
at which it would be socially optimal, which reinforces the need to reduce contacts of the
infected (e.g. quarantining, sick paid leave). Additionally, we compute the socially optimal
strategies, given the costs to incentivize people to change from their selfish strategies. We find
that if we impose limited resources, curbing contacts of the infected is more important after
the peak of the epidemic has passed. Lastly, we compute the price of anarchy of this system,
to understand the conditions under which large discrepancies between the MFE and socially
optimal strategies arise, which is when public policy would be most effective.
1 Introduction
The current COVID-19 pandemic has shown that posing a public policy to fight such an outbreak
is an extremely difficult and interdisciplinary task. A big part of such policy is urging people
to practice social distancing, which is to reduce interpersonal contacts to slow down the spread
of infection. However, it is uncertain whether people are incentivized enough to practice social
distancing, when there are clear benefits to making contacts, such as earning wages from jobs, as
well as the general human need for social relationships.
Given this trade-off between the additional utility from making more contacts, and the addi-
tional chance of infection from those contacts, we will compare 1) the selfish strategies, in which
individuals make contacts to optimize only their own utilities and 2) socially optimal strategies, in
which individuals make contacts which optimize the utility of the total population.
Previous work has explicitly included contact behaviors as control variables into the classical SIR
model and have shown that different dynamics can emerge with adaptive behavior [1–3]. Disease
dynamics has also been studied with game theory, focusing mostly on steady-state problems or
those related to vaccination [4–6]. Optimal control theory is also often used to study policy inter-
ventions on infectious disease dynamics [7, 8]. Our work here builds on these previous models to
pose a mean-field game problem of social distancing, explicitly modeling the feedback between the
individuals and the population structure. The individual, which is susceptible (S), infected (I), or
recovered (R), each chooses a dynamic contact strategy to maximize its accumulated utility over
the time period.
Mean-field games is a recently developing field, studying dynamic game theoretic problems of
large number of players [9, 10]. Our model is a relatively simple formulation of the mean-field
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games, in which we have a deterministic game with 3 discrete states (S,I,R) in continuous time.
Depending on the number of contacts each individual makes, the dynamics of the population follow
the SIR model, and the anticipated population structure influences the computation of an individ-
ual’s optimal strategy. We take mean-field assumptions such that 1) the number of individuals in
the population is large (N → ∞), 2) the individuals are homogeneous within each compartment
and the population is well-mixed, and 3) individuals engage in symmetric interactions.
2 Model
2.1 SIR dynamics
Let xz be the fraction of the population in compartment z ∈ {S, I,R}. Then we can write the
dynamics of the SIR system as 
x˙S = −C(·)βxSxI
x˙I = C(·)βxSxI − µxI
x˙R = µxI (1)
C(·) is the rate that an S individual and an I individual make contact. Let a z individual at time
t choose cz(t) number of contacts. There are two intuitive ways of writing an expression for C(·)
in terms of the contact strategies. First is frequency-dependent, in which each contact made by
an S individual is with an I individual with probability, cI(t)xIcS(t)xS+cI(t)xI+cR(t)xR . Therefore in the
frequency-dependent case, we have C(·) = cS(t)cI(t)cS(t)xS+cI(t)xI+cR(t)xR . Second is density-dependent,
in which each contact made by a susceptible individual has probability of being with an infected
individual of cI(t)cmaxS cmaxI
. In this case, C(·) = cS(t)cI(t)cmaxS cmaxI . For the rest of this paper, we will assume
density-dependent contact rates. β is the likelihood that infection happens given the contact
between S and I, and µ is the rate of recovery from infection.
2.2 Utility of contacts
cz(t) is the contact strategy which is explicitly chosen by an individual. Large cz(t) means go-
ing out to work and socializing, while smaller cz(t) means refraining from those activities, and
practicing social distancing. uz(cz) denotes the utility received by a z individual from making cz
contacts, as a combination of economic gains and personal well-being. The realistic conditions
that we impose are the following. Starting from zero contacts, increasing the number of contacts
results in increased utility, reflecting human need for social interactions as well as the economic
gain of spending time at work. We assume that the marginal increase in utility is decreasing with
more contacts, until eventually, more contacts become detrimental.
Therefore, the appropriate functional form of uz(cz) must be a concave function with an inte-
rior maximum. One appropriate function form with interpretations of the parameters is uz(cz) =
(bzcz − c2z)γ − az where cz ∈ [0, bz] [2]. bz is a parameter of how the disease impacts the marginal
economic productivity of the individual. Large bz means that the individual has the choice to make
more contacts, as well as receive higher marginal utility from making contacts. az is a parameter of
the baseline cost of being infected, such as an individual’s general propensity to be healthy. These
two parameters attempt to decompose the effect of the disease into economic cost and health cost.
Some assumptions on these parameters are that bS = bR > bI and aS = aR < aI , since the infected
become impaired in economic productivity, as well as suffer the health cost compared to the S and
R. γ changes the concave shape of the function, and γ ∈ (0, 1] ensures that uz(cz) is concave
everywhere in the domain.
From this utility function, we see that each individual has some optimal level of social contacts.
The utility of a z individual is maximized at bz2 , which is each individual’s optimal contact strategy
in the absence of adaptive behavior in response to the risk of infectious disease.
2.3 Value function
Over a time period, t ∈ [0, T ], an individual’s total utility is the sum of utility gained at each time
point. For example, a recovered individual, who makes continuous contact decision c(t), receives
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Figure 1: uz(cz) is shown where z ∈ {S,R} are healthy (green) and z ∈ {I} is infected (red) and
the parameters are bS = bR = 10, bI = 6, aS = aR = 0, aI = 1, and γ = 0.25. A healthy individual
gains utility from making more contacts, but eventually does not want to make more, when cS = 5.
The infected suffers the baseline cost, but also gains some utility from making contacts, although
at a lower rate compared to the healthy.
total utility
∫ T
0
uR(c(t))dt. Let us define VR(t) to be the total future utility expected by the R
individual at time t until T . From this formulation, it follows that VR(T ) = 0, and
VR(t) =
∫ T
t
uR(c(t))dt = uR(c(t))dt+
∫ T
t+dt
uR(c(t))dt = uR(c(t))dt+ VR(t+ dt) (2)
Similarly for S and I individuals, we write VS(t) and VI(t), which depends on the rate at which
the individuals move between the SIR states. (Fig. 2)
Figure 2: Between time t and t+dt, S, I, and R individuals move between the states at these rates.
The S individual becomes infected at a larger rate with higher contact rates. The I individual
becomes recovered at a constant rate of µdt. The recovered individual remains in the state.
From these transition rates, we can write the Bellman equations, which gives the value functions
for an individual in S, I, and R state as:
VS(t) = max
cS
{∫ t+dt
t
uS(cS)dt+ (1− C(·)βxIdt)VS(t+ dt) + C(·)βxIdtVI(t+ dt)
}
VI(t) = max
cI
{∫ t+dt
t
uI(cI)dt+ (1− νdt)VI(t+ dt) + νdtVR(t+ dt)
}
VR(t) = max
cR
{∫ t+dt
t
uR(cR)dt+ VR(t+ dt)
}
(3)
with terminal conditions, VS(T ) = VI(T ) = VR(T ) = 0.
2.4 Mean Field Equilibrium solution
The SIR dynamics and the Bellman equations are coupled by the contact strategies, cS , cI , cR, and
the population, xS , xI , xR. Therefore, the solution to this problem is the mean-field equilibrium
3
(MFE), which is the fixed point (ceqS , c
eq
I , c
eq
R , xS , xI , xR) such that 1) the strategies c
eq
S (t), c
eq
I (t),
ceqR (t) are the optimal solutions in equations 3 given xS , xI , and xR and 2) xS , xI , and xR are
solutions to the system of ODEs in equation 1 given the optimal strategies.
2.5 Socially Optimal solution
In contrast, we can also characterize the socially optimal solution. If a central planner can choose
the contact strategies of the population to maximize the utility of the entire population, the
resulting socially optimal solution solves the dynamic optimization problem,
coptS , c
opt
I , c
opt
R = arg max
∫ T
0
xS(t)uS(cS(t)) + xI(t)uI(cI(t)) + xR(t)uR(cR(t))dt (4)
3 Results
3.1 Mean Field Equilibrium solution
Proposition 1. The optimal strategy for an R individual is ceqR = 0.5bR and the corresponding
optimal value function is VR(t) = −umaxR t+ umaxR T .
Proof. We can substitute the Taylor expansion VR(t + dt) = VR(t) + V˙R(t)dt, and take only the
first order dt terms.
VR(t) = max
cR
{∫ t+dt
t
uR(cR)dt+ VR(t) + V˙R(t)dt
}
=⇒ −V˙R(t) = max
cR
{
uR(cR)
} (5)
(6)
uR attains its maximum, u
max
R , when c
eq
R = 0.5bR, so we have
V˙R(t) = −umaxR =⇒ VR(t) = −umaxR t+ C (7)
With the terminal condition, VR(T ) = 0, we have VR(t) = −umaxR t+ umaxR T .
In our model, the recovered individuals do not become reinfected, so they do not have any
reason to decrease contacts. Therefore, they always choose maximum contact rates.
Proposition 2. The optimal strategy for an individual in the infected state is ceqI = 0.5bI and the
corresponding optimal value function is VI(t) = VR(T )− u
max
R −umaxI
µ (1− eµ(t−T ))
Proof. Substituting the first order Taylor expansion and taking only the first order terms,
VI(t) = max
cI
{∫ t+dt
t
uI(cI)dt+ (1− µdt)(VI(t) + V˙I(t)dt) + µdt(VR(t) + V˙R(t)dt)
}
=⇒VI(t) = max
cI
{∫ t+dt
t
uI(cI)dt+ VI(t) + V˙I(t)dt− µVI(t)dt+ µVR(t)dt
}
=⇒− V˙I(t) = max
cI
{
uI(cI) + µ(VR(t)− VI(t))
}
(8)
(9)
(10)
Because uI(cI) is the only term dependent on cI , the value function attains its maximum, u
max
I ,
when ceqI = 0.5bI .
−V˙I(t) = umaxI + µ
(
VR(t)− VI(t)
)
(11)
VR(t) is known from Proposition 1, and this is a first-order linear ordinary differential equation
that can be explicitly solved with integrating factor. Using the terminal condition, VI(T ) = 0, we
can find
VI(t) = VR(t)− u
max
R − umaxI
µ
(1− eµ(t−T )) (12)
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The infected individuals, similar to the recovered individuals, do not have a reason to decrease
contacts. The corresponding value function, VI(t) is bounded by VR(t), and the difference is bigger
for smaller µ, since it implies longer time spent as an infected.
Proposition 3. The optimal strategy for a susceptible individual is ceqS (t) < 0.5bS during time
0 ≤ t < T .
Proof. Substituting the Taylor expansion and taking only the first order terms,
VS(t) = max
cS
∫ t+dt
t
uS(cS)dt+
(
1− cScIβxIdt
)
VS(t+ dt) + cScIβxIdtVI(t+ dt)
=⇒VS(t) = max
cS
∫ t+dt
t
uS(cS)dt+ VS(t) + V˙S(t)dt− cScIβxIdt(VS(t)− VI(t))
=⇒− V˙S(t) = max
cS
uS(cS)− cScIβxI(VS(t)− VI(t))
(13)
(14)
(15)
The objective function is concave, so we set the derivative equal to 0 to find c∗S .
duS
dcS
∣∣∣
cS=c
eq
S
= 0.5bIβxI(VS(t)− VI(t)) (16)
uS is concave, so c
eq
S can be uniquely found. Also, we have VS(t) > VI(t) for all t < T . This is
because starting from the terminal condition VS(T ) = VI(T ) = 0, if at any time t we are sufficiently
close to VS = VI , V˙S(t) = −umaxS < −umaxI = V˙I(t). Therefore, 0.5bIβxI(VS − VI) > 0 for t < T ,
and ceqS < 0.5bS .
Note that ceqS is smaller for bigger values of bIβxI(VS(t) − VI(t)), which means that the sus-
ceptibles should decrease contact if 1) infected population gets large, 2) the disease spreads well,
3) cost of being infected is large, or 4) if the disease minimally affects the ability of the infected.
Numerical results
We use discrete time steps ∆t for the equations. With some initial c0 = (c0S , c
0
I , c
0
R), we compute
x0 = (x0S , x
0
I , x
0
R) using the ODE forward equations. Then, c
1 can be computed via backward
induction with given x0. We continue this until we find ck and xk such that ck = ck−1 and
xk = xk−1, which is the MFE solution.
With disease parameters β = 0.03 and µ = 0.1, and utility parameters bS = bR = 10, bI = 6,
aS = aR = 0, aI = 4, and γ = 0.25, Fig. 3 shows the computed MFE. We see that the spread of
infection is mitigated by the behavioral changes by the susceptible population, compared to the
classical case in which no adaptive behavior is considered. As we showed in Proposition 1 and 2,
the recovered and infected population have no incentive to lower their contact rates, and so they
continue at their maximum level of activities. The susceptible population lowers their contact rate
to balance their immediate utilities and their expected cost of possibly getting infected.
Fig. 4 shows the cumulative epidemic curve of the MFE solution and the classical SIR for different
parameter values of β, µ, bI , and aI . For any set of parameter values, the MFE solution, by
considering the adaptive behaviors, results in smaller final size as well as more gradual spread of
the epidemic. If the disease is more infectious (large β), the MFE solution, just like the classical
SIR solution, shows faster spread as well as larger final size, although mitigated compared to
what the classical SIR model would predict (Fig. 4a). If the disease has longer recovery time
(small µ), the classical model predicts faster spread, but we see that the MFE solution does not
always move in the same direction. For example, when µ = 0.02, it might be intuitive to predict
that since µ is small, the population will get infected faster, but because we explicitly consider
the decision of each individual in our model, we predict a very gradual epidemic, as it becomes
optimal to further suppress contacts to avoid getting infected in the first place (Fig. 4b). bI and
aI are parameters which would not be included in the classical SIR model, but they will change
the predicted epidemic curves. If a disease does not particularly affect the infected individual’s
productivity (high bI), the disease will spread as if its transmission rate β is higher (Fig. 4c). The
epidemic spread as predicted by the classical SIR model would not change with aI , but the MFE
solution shows smaller epidemic and flatter growth rate for high aI , as individuals choose to make
less contacts to avoid the high cost of becoming infected (Fig. 4d).
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Figure 3: The top figure shows xz for z ∈ {S, I,R}, the SIR dynamics for MFE solution (solid
lines) and the classical case without adaptive behaviors (dashed lines). Bottom figure shows ceqz (t)
for z ∈ {S, I,R}.
3.2 Socially optimal solution
We pose a centralized control problem, in which we find (coptS , c
opt
I , c
opt
R ) to maximize the utility of
the entire population. Therefore we solve
coptS (t), c
opt
I (t), c
opt
R (t) = arg max
∫ T
0
xS(t)uS(cS(t)) + xI(t)uI(cI(t)) + xR(t)uR(cR(t))dt
subject to:

x˙S = −cScIβxSxI
x˙I = cScIβxSxI − νxI
x˙R = νxI
(17)
(18)
In order to solve the optimal control problem, we use Pontryagin’s maximization principle, which
gives the necessary conditions for the optimal controls, given the evolving dynamics of the system.
Theorem 3.1 (Pontryagin’s Maximization Principle). Let x = [xS , xI , xR]
T and c = [cS , cI , cR]
T .
For the given deterministic dynamics, x˙ = f(x, c), the Hamiltonian is defined as
H(x, c,λ, t) := L(x, c) + λT f(x, c)
where λ(t) is the costate trajectory. If x(t), copt(t) is the optimal trajectory in 0 ≤ t ≤ T from
x(0), then λ(t) satisfies
−λ˙ = Hx(xopt, copt,λ, t) = Lx(xopt, copt) + λT fx(xopt, copt)
and copt is the solution to the optimization problem,
copt = argmax
c
H(xopt, c,λ)
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(a) Cumulative curves (0.01 ≤ β ≤ 0.05) (b) Cumulative curves (0.02 ≤ µ ≤ 0.1)
(c) Cumulative curves (2 ≤ bI ≤ 10) (d) Cumulative curves (2 ≤ aI ≤ 10)
Figure 4: The cumulative epidemic size is shown for the MFE solution (red) and the classical
SIR (black) for the range of given parameter. For each (a)-(d), five cumulative curves are shown
corresponding to five values of the given parameter in the range, where the more transparent lines
are smaller parameter values.
Proposition 4. The socially optimal contact rate of the infected, coptI must always be less than
the MFE contact rate, ceqI during time 0 ≤ t < T .
Proof. We can apply the Pontryagin’s maximization principle, which gives the necessary condition
for optimality. If coptS , c
opt
I , c
opt
R are optimal solutions, then there exist Lagrangian multipliers,
λS(t), λI(t), λR(t), such that λS(T ) = 0, λI(T ) = 0, λR(T ) = 0, and for t < T , they satisfy:
−λ˙S = coptS coptI βxI(λI − λS) + uS(coptS )
−λ˙I = coptS coptI βxS(λI − λS) + µ(λR − λI) + uI(coptI )
−λ˙R = uR(coptR )
coptS , c
opt
I , c
opt
R = arg max cScIβxSxI(λI − λS) + µxI(λR − λI) +
∑
z
xzuz(cz)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
Note the similarities between our expressions for λS , λI , λR and VS , VI , VR from the MFE, aside
from the additional term in (20). Intuitively, this additional term represents the I individual caring
about the consequences of its contact strategy on the population, which the selfish I individual
does not take into account in its objective function. It can be interpreted as the I individual’s
internalized negative externalities (i.e. thinking about our actions and their impact on others).
First, we see that the cR term in the objective function can be separated, and so we can find the
maximizer, coptR = 0.5bR = c
eq
R , which gives λR(t) = VR(t) for all t. Therefore, the optimization
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problem for c∗S and c
∗
I is
coptS , c
opt
I = arg maxxSuS(cS) + xIuI(cI)− cScIβxSxI(λS − λI) (23)
Clearly, βxSxI > 0 for all t, assuming nontrivial initial conditions, xS(0) > 0 and xI(0) > 0. Also,
λS − λI > 0 for t < T . Starting from the given terminal conditions λS(T ) = λI(T ) = 0, if at any
point we get sufficiently close to λS = λI , we see that λ˙S < λ˙I , so λS will be strictly larger than
λI in 0 ≤ t < T . Therefore, βxSxI(λS − λI) > 0 for all 0 ≤ t < T .
With the utility function uz(cz) = (bzcz − c2z)γ − az, we will prove that coptI < 0.5bI for all t
by dividing the problem into two cases: i) γ < 1 and ii) γ = 1.
i) γ < 1
From (23), coptI = 0.5bI only if c
opt
S βxSxI(λS − λI) = 0, which is only true if coptS = 0. However,
we see that for some given coptI , c
opt
S can be computed to be
duS
dcS
∣∣∣
cS=c
opt
S
− coptI βxI(λS − λI) = 0
=⇒ γ(bS − 2c
opt
S )
(bSc
opt
S − copt2S )1−γ
= coptI βxI(λS − λI)
(24)
(25)
Since the left side monotonically decreases from∞ to 0 in the domain [0, 0.5bI ], coptS can be uniquely
found and since the right side is bounded, coptS > 0. Therefore, c
opt
I < 0.5bI must be true.
ii) γ = 1
Plugging in γ = 1 gives the optimization problem as
coptS , c
opt
I = arg maxxS(bScS − c2S) + xI(bIcI − c2I)− cScIβxSxI(λS − λI) (26)
Assume for contradiction that coptI = 0.5bI at some t < T . This is only possible if c
opt
S = 0, which
implies that bS ≤ coptI βxI(λS − λI) holds true. Since the optimal contact rates at time t is given
as coptS (t) = 0 and c
opt
I (t) = 0.5bI , we can plug these in to get
λ˙S(t) = 0
λ˙I(t) = −µ(λR(t)− λI(t))− umaxI
(27)
(28)
With the known dynamics of λS , λI , and xI , we can use the first order Taylor expansion to find
xI(t+ dt)
(
λS(t+ dt)− λI(t+ dt)
)
= (xI − µxIdt)
(
λS − λI + µ(λR − λI)dt+ umaxI dt
)
= xI
(
λS − λI + µ(λR − λI)dt+ umaxI dt− µ(λS − λI)dt
)
> xI(λS − λI)
(29)
(30)
where the last inequality is due to λR being the upper bound of λS . We see that c
opt
I βxI(λS −λI)
is monotonically increasing in time, and therefore, if (coptS , c
opt
I ) = (0, 0.5bI) is the optimal solution
at time t, it is also the solution at time t + dt. This means that λS − λI must be increasing in
time, but then it cannot satisfy the transversality condition, λS(T ) = λI(T ) = 0. Therefore, by
contradiction, c∗I < 0.5bI for all 0 ≤ t < T .
This proposition implies that the selfish behavior of the infected is never optimal for the pop-
ulation, and so the appropriate policy in all cases is to decrease the contacts of the infected below
the level that they want to selfishly make.
Numerical results
For the same set of parameters as in Fig. 3, we can compute the socially optimal solution. The
optimal solution as shown in Fig. 5b is to completely suppress the contacts of the I, so that no
additional infection can take place, while the susceptible population resumes normal activities.
In fact, this is most often the socially optimal strategy. An exception is if a large part of the
population was already infected initially (Fig. 5c,d). Here, 70 percent of the population is already
infected, and so the optimal contact strategy is to completely isolate the susceptible until the
number of infected decreases to some level, at which, we go back to complete quarantining of the
I and the resuming of normal activities by the S.
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Figure 5: (a) shows the same MFE solution as in Figure 3. (b) shows the socially optimal solution,
which maximizes the total utility of the population. (c) and (d) show the MFE solution and
socially optimal solution for a different initial population, (xS(0), xI(0)) = (0.3, 0.7).
3.3 Cost of central planning
While we assume in computing our socially optimal solution that the central planner can freely
choose contact rates, it is not realistic. For example, in the optimal solutions of Fig. 5b, complete
curbing of contact rates of I does not come free. Whether it is done through quarantining or
providing proper incentives to keep infected people from making social contacts, they cost resources.
Additionally, people do not generally like their choices to be decided by an authority, so this cost can
also include the ”loss in freedom,” which the central planner would want to minimize. Therefore,
a realistic addition to the problem is a cost for deviating away from the population’s MFE.
coptS (t), c
opt
I (t), c
opt
R (t) = argmax
c
∫ T
0
[
xS(t)uS(cS(t)) + xI(t)uI(cI(t)) + xR(t)uR(cR(t))
− 1
2
k
∑
xz(cz − ceqz )2
]
dt (31)
k ≥ 0 is the parameter balancing the competing objectives of maximizing total utility and mini-
mizing the deviations from selfish strategies. When k = 0, the solution to the objective function
is the socially optimal solution, and when k is large, the solution is the MFE solution. As k is
increased from 0, we can find the solution which balances the tradeoff.
As we see in Fig. 6, for different values of k, we compute the socially optimal contact rates of
the population. Another interpretation is that given limited resources to control contact rates, we
find how it should be distributed during t ∈ [0, T ]. We see a common result among the range of
values for k, which is that when susceptibles have low contact rates, it is less important to keep the
infected contact rates as low. Instead, it is more optimal use of resources to make sure the infected
9
contact rates after the peak of the epidemic is lowered because this is when the susceptibles start
ramping up to normal activities, thus posing higher risk of a second epidemic. Another reason
is that because the number of infected is smaller at this time and the imposed cost is fixed per
capita, the same amount of resources is more efficiently used by controlling the smaller number of
I rather than the larger number during the peak.
3.4 Price of Anarchy
We compute the price of anarchy (PoA), which is a measure of how much the system degrades due
to the selfish strategies of each compartment. In the context of mean-field games, it is the ratio of
the total utility of the population adopting MFE strategies to the total utility of the population
adopting socially optimal strategies [11]. The PoA is given by
PoA =
Vopt(0)
xS(0)VS(0) + xI(0)VI(0) + xR(0)VR(0)
(32)
where Vopt is the maximum of the objective function in (17). The PoA, computed for ranges of
β, µ, bI , and aI , is shown in Fig. 7. While one parameter is changed, the others were kept fixed
with the values from Fig. 3.
As β gets larger, PoA increases because each selfish behavior of the infected becomes magnified
by each infecting more susceptible population per contact (Fig. 7a). We see a similarly increasing
trend as µ gets smaller, because it increases the time spent infected (Fig. 7b). However, increase
in β results in decreasing marginal gain in PoA while decrease in µ results in increasing marginal
gain in PoA. Even for unreasonably large β, the overall utility suffers by around 11%, while small
µ can cause a decline of 45%.
Fig. 7c shows that an intermediate value of bI results in the largest PoA. This non-monotonic
relationship is because of the trade-offs of large bI . On one hand, large bI means that the disease
does not affect the day-to-day productivity of the infected as severely, and so the infected are not
as penalized. On the other hand, this also means that the infected are able to be more active and
making more contacts, which infects more susceptibles. These two opposing effects are balanced
near bI = 5, where the PoA is at its maximum. When aI is large (Fig. 7d), the baseline cost of
getting infected is larger, which results in less utility at each time point.
4 Discussion
4.1 Possible additions
The public policy response to COVID-19 is an extremely complex problem with many factors which
this paper has not covered. This model and analysis are, in many ways, the simplest baseline case
from which we can make more realistic to fit a particular disease. First, we can pose the problem
with different compartmental models. For example, if we take the SIS model, we would see different
optimal strategies since the infected also face the burden of social distancing. In the case of COVID-
19, it will be most useful to include a compartment with asymptomatic transmission, which behaves
like S from the central planner’s perspective. The socially optimal strategies depended on being
able to distinguish the S and the I, when it is not always the case. The lack of available testing
of COVID-19, for example, provides the uncertainty within the population as well as from the
central planner’s perspective. Second, we can add heterogeneity to the population by including
state variables such as age, socioeconomic status, or level of prosociality. By explicitly adding the
different subpopulations, we can understand the game theoretic dilemma at play between the old
vs. the young, the financially stable vs. the unstable, or the prosocial vs. antisocial. Then, more
specific policies may be proposed that target the contact strategies of a particular group.
4.2 Some conclusions
While our analysis does not include many important factors, we can still make some general
conclusions.
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Selfish strategies still ”flatten the curve.”
By including adaptive behavior of individuals, our model predicts epidemic curves with flatter
growth rate, compared to the classical counterparts. In our simple model, the curve is flattened
naturally because of susceptibles who weigh the trade-off between current utility of making contacts
and the future cost of getting infected. The recovered and the infected do not have any trade-offs
to decrease contacts. Even if only the susceptibles are practicing social distancing, it still decreases
the number of contacts of the system, and so the infected population reaches a smaller peak (Fig. 3,
4). It should be emphasized that the curve is flattened because individuals anticipate future growth
in infections and decrease their contacts to avoid being exposed to the infected individuals. If the
possible outbreak is flat-out denied by the media, then individuals will not adapt their behaviors,
causing an unmitigated large peak in the infected population. Therefore, it is the responsibility of
the policymakers to clearly communicate the existence and extent of the spreading disease.
Selfish strategy of the infected is never socially optimal.
We prove that the socially optimal strategy of the infected, coptI , is always less than c
eq
I . Therefore,
policies in response to the epidemic should decrease the contact rates of the infected. We see
examples of policies with this aim such as quarantining the infected or granting paid sick leave
to individuals who tested positive. Both policies respectively decrease the contact rates of the
infected directly or indirectly by decreasing bI , reducing the potential gain in utility of making
more contacts. Because reducing the contacts of the infected is so important, policymakers might
consider even more aggressive policies.
It is important to control the infected contact rates, following the peak of the epidemic.
If cost is imposed to the central planner in changing the contact rates of the individuals, we find the
new socially optimal contact rates, depending on k, which is the per capita unit cost of changing
contact rates. For k = 0 and k  1 respectively, we find the cost-imposed socially optimal solution
to be the previously computed copt and ceq. For k values in between (Fig. 7), we commonly see
that when it is too costly to decrease the infected contact rate for the whole time period, it is most
beneficial to at least focus on decreasing after the epidemic has subsided. An assumption here is
that cost of central planning is constant in time, when it may not be in real world situations. When
outbreak is at its peak, more public attention is on the disease, and it may be easier to implement
social distancing or secure funding for quarantining. However, when the disease has subsided, it
might be harder to convince the public to behave differently.
This result reinforces the need for formal social distancing policy which goes beyond the peak
of the epidemic. When the disease is prevalent, social distancing can be naturally favored due to
individual optimization, but to sustain it for longer requires centralized public policy to prevent
second peaks. This general result is in agreement with other studies of COVID-19 policies which
mention the likely possibility of second peaks [12–14]. Additional work, using more realistic central
planning cost depending on time and population structure, will help us better understand how such
long-term social distancing policies should be implemented.
Policies are most needed for diseases with low µ, high aI , high β and intermediate bI .
By computing the price of anarchy, we can measure the effect of different parameters on how much
the system is degraded by the selfish behaviors. Diseases with low µ, high aI , high β, intermediate
bI , in this order, seem to most affect the population such that their selfish behaviors will degrade
the system more compared to central intervention.
An interesting future work will be to put different diseases on the spectrum of these 4 variables,
depending on its epidemiological characteristics as well as its economic and health effects on the
infected. Then, we can roughly categorize diseases which need to be centrally intervened in the
case of an outbreak.
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Figure 6: With initial condition xI(0) = 0.3, we compute the socially optimal contact strategies
and corresponding population dynamics for k = 0.4, 0.7, and 1. As k is increased, it becomes
more expensive to shift the infected strategies from the selfish strategy, and so the socially optimal
contacts of the infected is larger, as the cost of lowering it begins to outweigh the utility benefits.
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(a) PoA of β ∈ [0.005, 0.05] (b) PoA of µ ∈ [0.015, 0.15]
(c) PoA of bI ∈ [1, 8] (d) PoA of aI ∈ [1, 5]
Figure 7: We vary the model parameters and compute the price of anarchy (left) and the total
population utility of the socially optimal strategy (right, dashed) and the MFE strategy (right,
solid). The parameter space where PoA is high is where intervening public policy would be most
needed, since this is the case in which selfish strategies are most degrading the total utility.
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